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Abstract:  Fertility, as a component of population change, caught the attention of 
many demographers since the relationship between population and society has been 
established. Even though micro level theories successfully projected trends of fertility 
at local level but finding a global theory is still a way to go. Macro theories failed to 
overcome social, cultural, and political boundaries.  The solution can go either way. 
Demographers can all together give up on looking a grand theory. Or they can go for 
the regional theories because not all economic, social, or cultural mechanism operates 
equally to lower down fertility. The present paper is an attempt to question the 
validity of unified theory of fertility, thereby, an attempt to look for a modified 
version of fertility theory which would be better fit at the regional level. 
Key words: Fertility, theories of fertility, regional theory, unified theory, validity of 
fertility theory 
 
Résumé:  La fécondité, comme une composante de l'évolution démographique, a 
attiré l'attention de nombreux démographes depuis que la relation entre la population 
et la société a été établie. Même si la théorie micro-niveau a projeté à succès les 
tendances de la fécondité au niveau local mais il y a encore un longue chemin à 
parcourir à trouver une théorie globale. Macro théorie a échoué à surmonter les bornes 
sociales, culturelles et politiques. La solution peut aller à l'une ou l'autre route. Les 
démographes peuvent donner tous ensemble sur la recherche d'une grande théorie. Ou 
ils peuvent aller pour la théorie régionale parce que ce n’est pas tous le mécanisme 
économique, social, culturel fonctionne également à diminuer la fécondité. Le présent 
document est une tentative de remettre en question la validité de la théorie unifiée de 
la fécondité, de ce fait, une tentative de chercher une version modifiée de la théorie de 
féconditéqui serait mieux adaptés au niveau régional. 
Mots-Clés:  Fécondité, théorie de fécondité, théorie régional, théorie unifiée, validité 
de la théorie de fécondité 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Fertility receives phenomenonal attention from demographers not so long ago. Historically, as a 
component of population change, mortality gets the hype among the demographers. Reason is simple, 
people want to live first. If you live, you want to think about reproduction (Wunsch, 1995). Social 
policies, geared toward improving mortality condition, have no doubt a huge contribution to induce 
demographers to analyze other components of population change. In the very next phase, fertility was 
the buzzword. Groups of demographers spent sleepless night to explore causes related to high fertility. 
Sometimes they were concerned with high fertility and sometimes they were concerned with low fertility. 
Moot point is that fertility in either direction is a problem. This also becomes the starting point for 
explaining fertility from different perspectives. Some demographers unanimously view that this is also 
caused a perplexing situation, more specifically, stagnant condition from where demographers failed to 
traverse unplanned paths of fertility in some countries.   
Through out the early Greek and Roman periods, a number of theories have been proposed to explain 
desired population size and population distribution. Mercantilists accorded the strength of the state as in 
its population size and the predominance of the industry over the agriculture. Physiocrats strongly 
believed population as stimulating factor for agricultural production, and hence, the economy. However, 
Mathus’s theory on population was the direct hit to Mercantilists and Physiocrats (Daugherty and 
Kammeyer, 1995). The tension between food and population was not new but was never thought in the 
direction to social problems. To mitigate the problem, delayed marriage has been advised to lower 
fertility. Officially, this was the first theory ever which conceptualized fertility to figure out complex web 
of the relationship between fertility and society (Nam and Philliber, 1984). Since then, study of 
population in general and demographers in particular literally set their mind to examine the 
interrelationship between society and demographic processes, especially fertility. Consequently, this 
interrelationship provides a major impetus to demographers for looking into the reasons of high fertility 
experienced by some countries. No wonder, result was some unique theories to explain fertility.  
An overambitious project was explaining fertility with global theory. More importantly, a unified 
theory was attempted to explain fertility decline regardless of economic, social, and cultural settings. 
Was that endeavor successful? Did they end up with a unique theory of fertility decline at all? Do 
demographers need a theory of fertility decline? If so, what sort of theory is the crying need? This paper 
is an attempt to question the validity of unified theory of fertility, thereby, an attempt to look for a 
modified version of fertility theory which would be better fit at the regional level.   
Demography has been blessed with theories and sophisticated models. These theories and models 
come along with unique data set to forecast demographic processes. In most cases, demographers want 
to determine processes, causes, and consequences of demographic events that are being studied. Possible 
answers of these questions were tested on several occasions, if tested repeatedly, and if supported by 
available evidences, then these possible answers become part of the theory, eventually lead towards a 
theory. This is the most common process through which we get a theory (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996). Like other scientists, demographers do the same and try to find out the causal 
relationship between cause and effect and the temporal connection between cause and effect. However, 
demographers usually do not ask for all inclusive panacea or cause of all causes. We may call it 
demographers do not search for a grand theory.  
Mostly, demographic theories look for a small number of possible causes. In doing so, demographers 
use inter-disciplinary perspective to formulate theory based on micro level variables (Wunsch, 1995). 
The usual practice is that if explanation met sufficient and necessary condition to uncover the causal 
relationship and no alternatives are thought of at that point, those explanations considered as theory with 
best causal explanations. Are we missing something here? Are we going for a theory because we failed 
to propose one with far sighted and more predictive power or our soul is satisfied with the fact that any 
theory which followed  the ground rules for constructing theory is good enough to explain fertility?   
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2.  THEORIES OF FERTILITY DECLINE: HOW FAR HAVE WE COME?  
 
The major concern of fertility theory was to explain differential fertility pattern. Obviously, this 
explanation always rooted in relation to economic development. In 1958, Coale and Hoover stated that 
rapid population growth is detrimental to economic development. As number of children increases in the 
family, household expense increases and as a result people have less opportunity to save money. In order 
to feed extra manpower, government has to pay more money and has less money to invest. Simply, high 
fertility is discouraged. In contrast, Julian Simon argue that population is the ultimate resources for 
developing countries ((Kelley, 2001).With vast amount of manpower, these countries become major 
source of cheap labor for many developed countries. For a developed country, paying less than two 
dollars per day is a good deal and less burdensome if she has to hire her own folks. For a developing 
country, at the end of the day, minimum wage paid up by the developed world is a big deal. This is one of 
the main reasons Singapore has changed her population policy. Singapore government has realized that 
they endangered their main economic strength, skilled labor force, through its population policy and 
thereby, modified population policy ((Darkakis-Smith, 1992). This debate revolved around the 
academicians for a while. Along the same line, we also observe the relationship between development 
and fertility, which is called demographic transition theory.   
No doubt, the theory which essentially brought fertility into focus was theory of demographic 
transition.  This theory is one of the earliest attempts to explain fertility decline in industrialized 
countries. The classical transition theory claims that industrialization, urbanization, and modernization 
are the major causes of low fertility in pre-transition era. Three stages were largely identified before a 
country complete high fertility to low fertility. Stage I of demographic transition is characterized by high 
fertility and by high mortality.  Stage II, which is known as “population explosion”, depicted as declining 
mortality with high level of fertility. In stage III, birth rate started to decline to approach low mortality 
(Thompson, 1929; Notestein, 1945). However, theory has never  
been gone unchallenged. As Coale and Watkins found that fertility started to 
decline in some places before urbanization and industrialization took place (Coale and Watkins, 
1986). They also found out that fertility declines before mortality started declining (Kirk, 1996). The 
theory also failed to explain two issues – A. what level of development is required to reduce fertility? and 
B. how much time is needed?  
Coale figured out that besides socio-economic development, three other factors are needed to decline 
fertility. As he mentioned- A. fertility must be within the calculus of conscious choice, B. reduced 
fertility must be advantageous and C. effective techniques of fertility reductions must be available. 
However, he mentioned, “in some premodern societies all three prerequisites for a decline in fertility 
exists, and fertility is reduced before extensive modernization occurs” (Coale, 1973). This argument 
critically raises the validity of demographic transition theory.  
First, one of the main tenets of this theory is that mortality decline precedes fertility decline with a 
near constant fertility. This implies that mortality decline is too some extent prerequisite for fertility 
decline. As Ronald Freedman mentioned, “Most sociologists and demographers would probably 
agree...that one of the two basic causes of the general [fertility] decline was...a sharp reduction in 
mortality which reduced the number of births necessary to have any desired number of children (cited 
inVan de Walle, 1986: 201-202).” However, France and Germany were two good examples of 
simultaneous decline of both mortality and fertility back then. This implies that high fertility which 
thought to be the prime cause of population explosion is negated by the theory. Second, the transition 
theory describes that that all its “tenets” are universal and do not have regional variation. While there 
have been many local variations in the speed at which the vital revolution has occurred.  
Third, a large variation is also seen in marital fertility because of number of married women who 
were at their childbearing age. From the proximate determinants of fertility, we now know that four 
mechanisms cause to change fertility rate. These are: the proportion married, postpartum infecundability, 
contraception and induced abortion (Bongaarts, 1978). The very history of population growth in Europe 
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shows that never married population played a key role in reducing fertility. Fourth, even adjacent 
neighboring countries follow different patterns of demographic transition. Fifth, the major weakness of 
demographic transition theory is that “difficulty of defining precise thresholds” (Coale, 1973: 64). ) 
In contrast to the theory of demographic transition theory, sociologists have studied fertility not only 
from the point of society as a whole and but also groups and strata in a given society (Davis and Blake, 
1956). This model has been successful identifying some proximate determinants, which have substantial 
explanatory force with respect to the differentials of fertility across countries. The main problem of this 
model is that individual’s choice has no role to play in explaining fertility. 
Right after that, diffusion theory has been proposed to get a view of the process of fertility decline. 
Most of the developing countries experienced rapid mortality decline, high fertility, high population 
growth, low labor force participation of women, and difficulty providing universal education compared 
to the 19th century Europe. The main problem comes from the demographic transition theory to explain 
developing countries fertility because socio-economic conditions of the 19th century Europe were not 
same as developing countries (Teitelbaum, 1975). He provided some lists of causes what helped to 
decline fertility in LDCs. In many LDCs, socio-economic development was rapid. 
 
Table 1    Difference between Developing countries and 19th Century Europe 
 
Indicator Developing countries 19th century Europe 
Mortality decline Rapid Gradual 
Fertility  High Low 
Migration International migration is not 
possible 
Accommodate population growth by 
international migration 
Population growth High Low 
Population momentum Present Not present 
Occupational mobility and 
rural-to-urban mobility 
Not relevant Provides more opportunity 
Female labor force participation Few opportunity More opportunity 
Universal education Difficult to provide As not as difficult in developing 
countries 
 
Compared to Europe. Improved contraceptive technology and safe abortions techniques were readily 
available to these countries which were not the case for European countries (Table 1). The European 
transition starts with late marriage, where as fertility in developing countries, two factors-both marriage 
practices and fertility within marriages contribute to lower fertility. In addition, presence of small family 
norm, increasing interest among governments of LDCs to reduce fertility, availability of administrative 
and technological infrastructure, international assistance, and rapid pace of fertility caused to decline 
fertility in LDCs. Beaver argued that transition theory could achieve a moderate success in Latin 
America, if the theory has been substantially modified and included additional cultural factors (Beaver, 
1975). In contrast, the strong family planning program effort was implemented in many developing 
countries to set norms of small family size, which was an innovation.   
Establishing a more specific framework with testable hypotheses has been the goal of “diffusion 
theory.” “Diffusion exists when the adoption of innovative ideas (and corresponding behavior) by some 
individuals influences the likelihood of such adoption by others” (Montgomery and Casterline, 1993: 
458). The core theme of diffusion theory is that people do interact and aside form individuals role to 
lower fertility, their preference is always influenced by others’ preferences, cultural norms, and societal 
institutions. They collect information from others and try to act upon them. The process of gaining 
knowledge and the process of influencing others are the two major mechanisms of diffusion (Casterline, 
2001).  
Some found that even in pre-transitional nations qualify for diffusion to occur (Cleland and Wilson, 
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1987). Communication networks and the mass media act as two main pathways through which diffusion 
occurs. Communication networks literally maintain their relationship with reference groups which 
involve oral and written correspondence. Television, radio, and newspaper still remain the main sources 
of getting information for many. Both of these play a major role in diffusing social norms and 
conforming to the rest of the society.  
Once, social elites exclusively used birth control. Later, family planning programs disseminate 
messages about family planning methods and way to get methods. These two factors made it easy for 
general public to restrict their future birth. Birth control is no longer limited to well-educated, urbanized 
or high-income groups.  As Tsui mentioned, “The steps leading to a decision to adopt a method… which 
generally include the stages of becoming aware, becoming informed, evaluating, making a trial, and 
finally adopting the innovation” (Tsui, 1985: 117) which exactly follows the social learning and social 
influence aspects of diffusion theory. If development is the key factor to use contraceptive methods and 
thereby to experience low fertility, then developing countries never had a chance lowering their fertility 
down. Widespread use of contraceptive and low fertility rate is the two best examples of diffusion as an 
innovation. By using World Fertility Survey data, Tsui also described five stages of diffusion process- 
awareness, knowledge, evaluation, trial and adoption- that portray the fertility decline in many 
developing countries.  
When comes to contraceptive use, we do not expect much from disadvantaged groups. Diffusion 
theory rightly explained that these groups would be using contraceptives if they were given right 
information and ways to reduce fertility. This theory is also right in the sense that it correctly observed 
that disadvantageous group has less opportunity to innovate because of their position in socio-economic 
status ladder. The only thing differ is that timing is different for different group. It could take a little time 
in rural areas than urban areas, but it would happen. However, if we do not observe that a lion share of 
couples stop using contraceptives and fertility still remains the same, we can conclude that diffusion 
does not work for developing countries. But to our surprise, many couples in developing countries 
quickly ensued from one stage to another. Further evidence of cultural diffusion is that child spacing and 
using contraceptives become part of many women’s lives around the globe.  
 Two best examples of fertility decline through diffusion are Taiwan and Egypt. In fact, a local 
program with diffusion agenda was proposed, which was a great success. Following that Taiwan’s family 
planning program shows how communications networks work, even though this program start with 
completely different agenda other than that of diffusion (Montgomery and Casterline, 1993). Egypt took 
a program called “Minya Initiative” and held total 460 meetings in Upper Egypt. In most cases, audience 
was men. Right after attending the meeting, ninety percent men spoke with their spouses about using 
contraceptives, which basically portrays the two major steps of diffusion- awareness and diffusion 
(Johns Hopkins Center for Communication Programs, 1997). In sum, diffusion works well in many 
developing countries translating fertility transition into by using contraceptives. 
One odd was that the theory failed to explain the reasons why individuals change their fertility 
behavior. Another missing link is how to explain the behavior of persons who took the first step to 
change fertility behavior. Assumption is that people receive important information from someone whom 
they trust, then share that views with their spouses and try to use contraceptives, if it goes with their 
lifestyle; they eventually practice family planning methods. From this, it is almost impossible to explain 
the behavior of innovator. Some view that this theory is too much behavioristic in nature.  
The theory also did not mention other forms of social learning which deserve attention: social 
comparison and social coercion. Sometimes people compare themselves with others who are positioned 
well in the society and try to find out the reasons of forming a happy family and try to practice same 
philosophy in their life. However, not all people react the same way that means, if we compare people 
based on their willingness to use contraceptives and thereby, compare fertility between groups that 
would eventually lead to some form of fallacy. In the same line, people are being forced to change 
behavior. Likelihood is that if government implement polices and people act as per policy that also 
lowers down the fertility rate: China’s one child policy is the best example in this regard (Attane, 2002). 
However, little research has been conducted to test the hypotheses associated with diffusion theory.  This 
implies that empirical evidence to support this theory is scanty (Casterline, 2001).   
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Before fertility transition takes place, we see some changes in demographic behavior. There has 
always been an excess production of children because of lack of contraceptives, lack of knowledge about 
availability of contraceptives, and lack of understanding about fertility behavior. As society moves onto 
low fertility rate, diffusion process induces couples to limit family size. If things did not go as it is 
projected, right after the transition, fertility rate will increase one more time. The main strength of 
diffusion theory is that diffusion goes well along with other substantive interpretations. Diffusion truly 
affects all aspects of the household decision making frameworks. In addition, diffusion as a process can 
and do affect the psychological and monetary costs of fertility control.  Moreover, it can also affect the 
perceived benefits of fertility control. 
Unlike social demographers, Economists stress on behavior with conscious and rational choice. In 
most cases, their discussion includes economic factors which help in reducing fertility. Becker pointed 
out that number of children is associated with old age security and mental satisfaction. These two reasons 
prompted individuals to have more children (Becker, 1988). However, before Easterlin (1968) the costs 
of fertility were never taken into account which might cause high fertility in some societies. Even if 
individuals chose to use contraceptives, they may not do so due to non-availability of contraceptive 
methods and high costs of fertility regulation. In addition, for the first time psychic costs of having 
children has entered in the fertility model. The model did not make it clear whose psychic cost was the 
focal point. This model is claimed to be too deterministic and economic in nature, thereby failed to 
capture other factors which may have role in declining fertility.  
Caldwell (1982) attempted to explain the reasons that work in reducing fertility. Pre-modern and 
pre-transition period is characterized by extended family with house full of children. Economic life is 
very much in touch with reproductive life. Household heads never felt controlling fertility as more 
children means more labor power. Since they are the one exercise power over other members of the 
household, no couple has ever dared to ask them about limiting family size. The trends changed, as 
socio-economic conditions changed. The rise of capitalism, which eventually leads to changes in 
familial mode of production, tended to see more children as burdens for family.  
In familial mode of production, children were also part of productive life and economic life. But 
under capitalist system, their role had been squeezed. Instead of working for the family, now family is 
working for them to raise them up and raising children under capitalists system is way too expensive. As 
a result, parents consciously choose to limit their family size and fertility declines. This explanation is 
also economically determined. Robinson (1997) made it very clear that demographers neglected an 
important biological factor which is sexual activities. Birth of a child is not always determined by 
demand, supply or costs. Not all think that children will provide economic, social, psychological support 
and old age security. This implies theory sometimes fail to explain individuals preference, taste, and 
even a regional difference. Moreover, not all theory is applicable to everywhere since fertility motivation 
is not equal in developed countries and developing countries.  
Since economic and sociological approach fail to capture the real dynamics of fertility decline, 
diffusionist theorists provided an alternative explanation. What they have been arguing, as people get to 
know new ideas and new attitudes towards birth control, some people will learn and adopt the new 
behavior pattern and attitude. By accepting new attitudes and new behaviors, they also conform to the 
law of having small family size. The pioneer group basically influences other people and they 
demonstrate the process what would be the cost and benefit of taking same reproductive choice. The 
theory gives credit to how ideas and behavior spread over time that also influences to decline fertility.  
However, behavior of pioneer group is not unraveled by the theory. Moreover, this theory indicates an 
isolated behavior from economic and social structure. Can we possibly do that? The answer is no. 
Over the years, demographers are perplexed by high fertility. As many countries introduced family 
planning program, fertility started to decline in some countries beyond demographers expectations. 
Their understanding was that a certain level of infra-structural development is much needed to decline 
fertility. This decline did not much with demographers’ usual formula. As a result, population talk is 
much more concentrated on micro-issues. We see the reflection in the agendas of population conference. 
Before Cairo Conference, the focus was on two issues- consequences of high fertility and ways of 
lowering fertility (Gulhati and Bates, 1974). Obviously, the major focus was at the macro-level and 
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consequently demographers proposed grand theories with high level abstraction. They were wishing to 
understand the whole situation and what is happening around them. Since these theories partially explain 
causes and consequences of high fertility but failed to explain regional variation, Post-Cairo population 
thinkers attempt to explain fertility decline based on micro-level variables.  
Their focus has been shifted from strictly demographic factors to micro level issues like sustainable 
development, gender issues, reproductive health and adolescent health, women’s right and 
empowerment, violence against women, female genital mutilation, the rights of indigenous people, 
family planning and so on. While focusing on other issues, they did not pay attention to the determinants 
or consequences of high fertility. No doubt, the 1994 International Conference has changed the whole 
focus of population issues (McIntosh and Finkle, 1995). Following is the key differences between 
Pre-Cairo and Post-Cairo population agenda which also shows major changes in issues and priorities of 
population issues (table-2). 
 
Table 2   Population Agendas of Pre-Cairo and Post-Cairo Population 
Conference 
 
Pre-Cairo Population Agenda Post-Cairo Population Agenda 
Macro Micro 
Aggregate Individual 
Directed toward population change Directed toward broader reproductive health, women’s 
right, and human right issue 
Demographic objectives were not 
subordinated 
Demographic objectives are subordinated 
Source of funding and budget issues 
were discussed 
Fund needed for proposed line of action is now a big issue 
as it never discussed in the Cairo conference. 
 
3.   TOWARDS A REGIONAL THEORY 
 
Theories of fertility provide a crucial insight for explaining fertility decline. These theories laid out a 
framework on the basis of economic, social, biological, cultural factors and so on. For years, these 
theories attempt to explain fertility of both developed and developing countries.  Not all underlying 
causes were present in developing world. Not all prerequisites were met by developing countries. With 
Western demographers wonder, fertility declined in some countries, but not declined in some other 
countries. Broadly, we could conclude that these theories were not sufficient enough to explain fertility 
decline. If we put simply, answer would be no. Can we conclude that those theories can explain 
differential pattern of fertility decline at the global level? Answer would be no.  
As it turns out that pace of fertility decline is different in the developed world and developing world. 
Some claim that one of the reasons that cause to different pace of fertility decline and that also partially 
fail fertility theories is that social norms have been altogether excluded from the analysis. This is one 
variable that cannot be explained by economic factors. Some mention that even though some aspects of 
cultural diffusion have been taken into consideration but still a complex web of cultural, socio-economic, 
and demographic issues remain unexplained. This is evident from the low fertility in European countries 
and high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa. So far there is not such a theory which combines all these factors 
under one umbrella. Is there an alternative? Or what would be the better theory for explaining fertility 
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decline? More simply, what we need? Whether we need a grand theory which would partially explain 
fertility decline or we need theories to explain regional variation- we need a consensus in this regard. 
 Since, social norms and cultural values proved to be two major factors in explaining high/low 
fertility,  and also have differential patterns in different countries, would not that be more logical to offer 
more micro theory based on region. More clearly, not all economic, social or cultural mechanisms will 
operate equally in every parts of the world, if we propose a theory with unique characteristics of region at 
a large, and include them in a regional model, that might have a better chance in explaining fertility. If 
grand theory appears to fail to capture the reasons of fertility decline at the global level, what is wrong 
with proposing a theory for regional level? All we need to explain why fertility decline, if regional level 
theory gives us better precision, why not we go for that? 
However, some argue against proposing regional theory. The reason is that they claim that sometimes 
demographers use culture as an escape-goat when comes to explaining human behavior, especially 
fertility decline. If we cannot explain dynamic nature of behavior, only conclusion we eventually made is 
that behavior must be culture specific. If we take culture as the most extreme exogenous variable then it 
allows us more predictive power in explaining fertility decline. From previous knowledge about theories 
of fertility decline, we know that social structure and economic structure is intertwined, the future theory 
should include both of them under one theoretical schema. But question of priority also remains the 
issue.  
If we prioritize economic structure, then some would argue that theory would be too economical 
nature. If we prioritize social structures, then further question will formulate against neglecting 
economic factors. As Marx has said that superstructure depends on base structure but it is also eminent 
that both of them complement each other. Both social structure and economic structure affect the level of 
social development. The empirical studies have shown that social structure and economic structure have 
independent effect on fertility decline and also these broad variables have joint effect on social 
development, which basically works here as an intermediate variable and tend to reduce fertility (Figure 
2). 
Kirk (1996) argue that economic development is not necessarily help declining fertility, rather 
diffusion within a specific cultural and linguistic region contributes more to decline fertility. Economic 
development came out as a sufficient cause but not a 
 







necessary cause for fertility decline (Coale, 1973). For example, many provinces in Europe had 
experienced fertility decline without being urban, under high infant mortality, and only a small 
percentage of people were involved with industrial occupations (Weeks,1999). Kondel and van de Walle 
provided a good summary that the real decline of European fertility occurred with widely differing social, 
economic, and demographic conditions. They suggested that -“1. Fertility declines took place under a 
wide variety of social, economic, and demographic conditions, 2. Family limitation was not 
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though a substantial proportion of births may have been unwanted, 3. Increases in the practice 
of family planning and the decline of marital fertility were essentially irreversible process, once 
under way, and 4. Cultural settings influence the onset and spread of fertility decline 
independently of socio-economic condition” (cited in Kirk, 1996:367). No wonder cultural settings 
have outright contribution in declining fertility.  
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
Transition demographers were not confident that economic growth in non-industrialized countries could 
outpace population growth. Because of that they shifted their focus of attention from social science 
perspective to policy science perspective. The standard approach now inclines toward policy oriented 
approach. However, there is no quick demographic solution to the problems of population pressure as 
Notestein mentioned. Some believe that a major change in social structure with a complete and integrate 
program of modernization and fertility would decline. By the mid-50s, Davis advocated social scientific 
perspective as it provides more importance on the interaction between socioeconomic change and 
demographic change. However, they realized at some point that their theories failed them in explaining 
fertility decline. The new policy oriented approach, which described fertility, has independent affect on 
other household level variables and fertility attitudes need to be changed basically generated from the 
older social scientific perspective, which viewed fertility as a dependent variable that is affected by 
socioeconomic change (Hodgson, 1983).  
Nonetheless, some view that micro-level phenomena can work as determinants of declining fertility. 
As it turns out that micro-level variables do help explaining fertility decline but still there remain 
regional variations. Simply, theorists who attempt to explain fertility by using social, economic and 
development approach were partially successful. Grand theory failed to explain regional variation. All 
these implies we are onlookers who wanted a theory which would provide us better precision and better 
result in explaining fertility. The very simple solution could be proposing regional theory with special 
emphasis on cultural setting along with other socio-economic variables which deserve attention. 
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